Standard & Poor's (S&P) cut some ratings for Tabreed from BBB- to BB, and from BB to B for the 2011 Sukuk. Tabreed shares fell 1.3% on Monday 01 December 2008, the day before this press release, and the last day of trading before the UAE National Day holiday and Eid holiday. See also Tabreed S&P CreditWatch from July 2008.
Press Release 02 December 2008:
UAE-Based National Central Cooling Ratings Cut To 'BB'; Off CreditWatch; Outlook Developing
London: Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term corporate credit rating on United Arab Emirates-based district cooling company National Central Cooling Co. PJSC (TABREED) to 'BB' from 'BBB-'. The outlook is developing. At the same time, the debt rating on the senior secured sukuk certificates due 2011 issued by Tabreed 06 Financing Corp. was lowered to 'BB' from 'BBB-' and the debt rating on the subordinated convertible sukuk certificates due 2011 issued by Tabreed 08 Financing Corp. was lowered to 'B' from 'BB'. All the ratings were removed from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on July 2, 2008, following the announcement of Tabreed's review of its business model with the intention to increase equity returns.
"The rating actions reflect a deterioration in Tabreed's credit quality following a weaker-than-expected financial performance partly resulting from higher-than-anticipated capital expenditure," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Karim Nassif.
This, in part, has contributed to increasing concerns regarding the company's liquidity over the next six to 12 months. As a result, we now view Tabreed's stand-alone credit profile to be in the low 'BB' category.
At the same time, we have reviewed our ratings approach to Tabreed in view of the increasing government and quasi-government ownership and involvement in the company's operations and finances - principally through the Abu Dhabi owned investment company Mubadala Development Co. PJSC (Mubadala) (AA/Stable/A-1+) - and the strategic importance of the company to the development of Abu Dhabi. We have changed our analytical approach to now consider Tabreed as a government-related entity (GRE). Accordingly, we consider that Tabreed should, as a result of this relationship with the government or its agencies, benefit from a one-notch uplift to its stand-alone credit quality. Notably, further notches for government support could be applied if it becomes apparent that Mubadala and/or the Abu Dhabi government are willing to extend more explicit and timely financial support for Tabreed, particularly in relation to the company's liquidity needs.
The rating action on the Tabreed 06 senior secured certificates mirrors the action on the long-term corporate credit rating. The rating action on the Tabreed 08 subordinated instrument reflects an additional notch for subordination from that previously considered now that the corporate credit rating on Tabreed is speculative grade. We consider that there are limited prospects for recovery of the Tabreed 08 notes due to their subordinated nature.
We consider the company's previously strong business profile as having weakened to satisfactory. This reflects a number of factors including: a significantly higher-than-anticipated capital expenditure over the last two years compared with original expectations (with higher-than-anticipated future committed capital expenditure over the 2008-2010 period); weaker-than-anticipated operating performance in terms of revenues and operating cash flows from the company's principal Chilled Water business segment, resulting in reduced profitability; as well as ongoing delays to concluding the joint venture with Aldar Properties PJSC (A-/Stable/A-2).
There remains, however, the potential for improvement in the company's revenues and operating cash flows from the Chilled Water business over the medium term as a result of the 340,000 tons of new chilling capacity due to be installed. However, to fully realize these benefits, Tabreed will need to improve its enforcement of payments due from commercial customers, which are about one-half of overall chilled revenues.
The company's already aggressive financial profile has further weakened, and we now consider this to be highly leveraged. This reflects the company's relatively weak and declining liquidity position, which requires both asset sales and the agreement of new facilities to meet future forecast financing needs. The company's projected negative free operating cash flow - funds from operations (FFO) excluding working capital changes and minus capital expenditure - is likely to continue beyond 2010. The financial profile also reflects weaker-than-anticipated financial metrics, including FFO to debt unlikely to reach 13% by year-end 2010 and debt service coverage ratios under Standard & Poor's criteria (which include UAE dirham AED 367 million principal repayment of the 2009 sukuk) likely to be below 1x in 2009, necessitating further drawing on debt facilities.
As of Nov. 28, 2008, Mubadala (a wholly owned investment vehicle of the Abu Dhabi state) has increased its equity ownership in Tabreed to 17% from less than 10%, and alongside other government-affiliated companies, the Emirate now owns about 28% of Tabreed. In addition, the government has increasing strategic influence over the company through board representation. The chairman of Tabreed is the managing director of the state-owned International Petroleum Investment Corp., while the vice chairman is chief operating officer of Mubadala. Tabreed's vice chairman is also head of its Finance Committee and is playing an increasing role in steering a new business plan in 2009. We also understand that Mubadala is supporting Tabreed with arrangements to secure the necessary liquidity funding in 2009 and that Tabreed is integral to the provision of district cooling under the Abu Dhabi 2030 development plan through, among other things, its monopoly position as the provider of district cooling for some of the Aldar (ALDAR) and Sourouh (SOROUH) led real estate projects.
A downgrade could occur if the company's liquidity position further weakens, for example through a failure to agree the joint venture terms or as a result of weaker-than-expected financial performance. The scope for an upgrade resulting from an improvement in operating performance is limited in the short term, but further tangible evidence of timely government support could lead us to consider a further notch uplift for government support.
Itīs a credit rating jargon...it may vary between the rating institutes but in general it might look like this.
Fitch International Long-Term Credit Ratings:
Investment Grade
AAA
Highest credit quality. 'AAA' ratings denote the lowest expectation of credit risk. They are assigned only in case of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events.
AA
Very high credit quality. 'AA' ratings denote expectations of very low credit risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.
A
High credit quality. 'A' ratings denote expectations of low credit risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to changes in circumstances or in economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.
BBB
Good credit quality. 'BBB' ratings indicate that there are currently expectations of low credit risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate but adverse changes in circumstances and economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity. This is the lowest investment grade category.
Speculative Grade
BB
Speculative. 'BB' ratings indicate that there is a possibility of credit risk developing, particularly as the result of adverse economic change over time; however, business or financial alternatives may be available to allow financial commitments to be met. Securities rated in this category are not investment grade.
B
Highly speculative.
For issuers and performing obligations, 'B' ratings indicate that significant credit risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is contingent upon a sustained, favorable business and economic environment.
For individual obligations, may indicate distressed or defaulted obligations with potential for extremely high recoveries. Such obligations would possess a Recovery Rating of 'RR1' (outstanding).
CCC
For issuers and performing obligations, default is a real possibility. Capacity for meeting financial commitments is solely reliant upon sustained, favorable business or economic conditions.
For individual obligations, may indicate distressed or defaulted obligations with potential for average to superior levels of recovery. Differences in credit quality may be denoted by plus/minus distinctions. Such obligations typically would possess a Recovery Rating of 'RR2' (superior), or 'RR3' (good) or 'RR4' (average).
CC
For issuers and performing obligations, default of some kind appears probable.
For individual obligations, may indicate distressed or defaulted obligations with a Recovery Rating of 'RR4' (average) or 'RR5' (below average).
C
For issuers and performing obligations, default is imminent.
For individual obligations, may indicate distressed or defaulted obligations with potential for below-average to poor recoveries. Such obligations would possess a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' (poor).
RD
Indicates an entity that has failed to make due payments (within the applicable grace period) on some but not all material financial obligations, but continues to honor other classes of obligations. .
D
Indicates an entity or sovereign that has defaulted on all of its financial obligations. Default generally is defined as one of the following:
Failure of an obligor to make timely payment of principal and/or interest under the contractual terms of any financial obligation;
The bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other winding-up or cessation of business of an obligor;
The distressed or other coercive exchange of an obligation, where creditors were offered securities with diminished structural or economic terms.
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